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THE primary object of the theological virtue of love is God.
We love God above everything and everybody else.
The motive of this love, the reason why we so love Him, is His own nature.
He is the sum of all perfections and therefore supremely lovable in and for Himself alone.
All love has two sides to it, a selfish and a selfless.
We love a person because of the pleasure and satisfaction it gives us:
but we also love because of the qualities in the other person that call forth our love.
So also we love God both because in loving Him we find our happiness and because of His own character of perfect goodness. It is
impossible to eradicate from true love either the selfish interested element, which desires enjoyment and possession, or the
selfless element, which desires only the good and the happiness of the beloved.
The selfish element in our love for God needs no comment.
In Him alone is to be found our peace and happiness.
In Him consists our eternal life.
Love of God is the true enlightened self-love.
Moreover, since all men by nature must desire their own good and happiness,
to seek our own good in loving God is no virtue, except in this respect.
God is not an object presented to the senses,
and it requires a persistent act of will to enable the reason to judge that God is the supreme source of
happiness, in the face of the rival and insistent suggestions to the contrary made by the senses.
And this persistent act of will is virtuous.
From this point of view, therefore, the virtue of love consists in our turning our backs on the many
things that the senses represent as desirable, and seeking our happiness in God.
The selfless element in our love of God consists in the will to
serve God and to wish Him good, in placing Him and His will above everything
else.
It shows itself in three ways.
It rejoices in the goodness of God;
it desires the constant increase of the glory given to God by His rational creatures -
"Hallowed be Thy Name";
and it is zealous in promoting the Kingdom of God.
When we thus speak of loving God in and for Himself, and of desiring always His good, without thought of ourselves and our
happiness, we may mean by love either an intensity of feeling or a judgment of appreciation. Intensity of feeling is not in our
power to command. It is a great and priceless gift that God bestows upon some. He inspires it, not according to a man's merit, nor
according to the capacity of our nature, but according to His own will Who distributes the gifts of the Holy Spirit to each man as
He wills. It is a gift devoutly to be prayed for, for it makes virtue and religion so much easier and fills the whole life with an
unspeakable sweetness and joy. But if it be denied, there is no ground for despair or self-condemnation. It is not in this sense
that we are commanded to love God. It is not necessary for salvation. It may be that we must wait to love Him with this fervent
passion until we see Him face to face and know Him as we are known, in all His beauty, holiness and love.
What is required of us here in this life is that by a constant act of will we put God
first; that we value Him before everything else.
The theological virtue of love is not primarily an emotion, its seat is in
the will.
Its object is not something that affects directly the senses, but something which is perceived by faith and known by the mind. It
is something to which we must direct our attention by an act of will. And as with faith and hope, so also with love,
God first moves the will.
Love is an infused virtue.
Man cannot by himself will to believe in God or to hope in God or to love God.
For man cannot lift himself above his own nature.
It is "natural" to man, in accordance with his merely human nature, to believe, hope and love the objects of his senses - what
he can see, what can be proved, what he can feel and so on.
That he should direct his attention to eternity, that he should believe in, hope
for and love things which are not of this world, requires the inspiration of God Who thereby lifts man above himself, and makes
possible, though not easy, a way of life not really belonging to man's created nature.
By the prior inspiration of God, then, man is enabled to love God in the sense that by an
act of will he prefers God above everything else.
St. Thomas (S. T. II, 11, quaest. xxiv, art. 8) asks the question whether even so God enables any man to love Him perfectly here
in this world.
His answer provides a further illustration of what the love of God means and how it is expressed. He says that a man may be said
to love God perfectly in three different senses.
First, when a man's whole being is wrapped up in God, when at every moment he is thinking of God and is moved by love of God.
This, says St. Thomas, is not possible in this life, but is reserved for Heaven.
Secondly, when a man devotes his whole time and energy to God, except when he is engaged upon the necessary cares of this world.
This is possible, but rare.
Thirdly, when a man has his heart wholly set upon God in such a way that he never thinks or wills anything which is opposed to
his love for God. This is common with those who love God. That is, with the saints, who may be said in this sense to love God
perfectly.
It is clear that St. Thomas is saying that in this life love of God is not an intensity of feeling, but an act of will.
What is meant by love of God is further illustrated in the next article, in which St.
Thomas discusses the degrees of love.
The first degree is that of beginners who study principally to avoid sin and to resist all temptations of the world, the flesh and
the devil to do anything which is opposed to the love of God.
The second degree is that of those who are concerned to increase and strengthen their love for God, not so much by resisting
temptation - for that has now become habitual - but by seeking out what is good.
The third degree is that of those who have by now but one object, to cleave to God and to enjoy Him.
That is, love begins by turning from the world and from self, it increases by drawing men to God, it is perfected when it finds
God and rests in Him.
From all of this it is clear that love for God is not so much an intensity of feeling as a judgment of value translated into action. It is to prefer God above all else and in consequence to refrain from everything that offends Him, and to seek those things that please Him. It is important to stress this point, because many good people are sometimes distressed because they feel so little love towards God. They make foolish comparisons between the depth of their passionate devotion to their children, or to a friend, and their love of God. But God does not judge us because of our feelings, which are not under our control. It is natural and inevitable that we experience stronger and keener emotions in connection with objects which are near and sensible than we do in regard to what is more remote and abstract. For intensity of feeling does not naturally arise from the worth or value of their object, but from its nearness to us, and the keenness with which we are aware of it. What is required of us when we are told to love God is that we should put a higher value on God than on anything else in the universe, so that we are prepared to lose the whole world rather than sin against God. So that if we can truly say of a child that we would rather he were dead than alive and wicked, or that he had some God-like quality, love or generosity, than all the riches in the world, then we do prefer God to the child and love God more than the child.
This brings us to a further object of the theological virtue of love.
We are bidden to love not only God but also our neighbours and ourselves.
Love of our neighbour in this connection means love for him as a rational creature, made like us in the image of God and
capable of loving Him.
The motive of this love is the same as the motive of love for God.
It is the goodness of God.
We love our neighbour because he is the object of God's goodness and because God dwells in Him.
We love our neighbour because God loves him and gave Himself for him.
Thus love of our neighbour in the theological sense differs from ordinary human love.
It is not inspired by gratitude for past services nor fired by lovable qualities, physical, mental or spiritual.
It is based simply and solely on the fact that our neighbour is made in the image of God and is the object of God's love.
And the good that our love wishes for our neighbour is that he, like us, may love God.
Thus it is true that no man can love his neighbour, in this sense, who does not himself love God;
because to love one's neighbour is to desire that he should love God.
And no one can love God who does not love his neighbour;
because to love God means to desire that all rational creatures also shall love and honour God.
And that desire is the heart of neighbourly love.
Just as it is thus our duty to love our neighbour by desiring that he shall eternally
love and honour God,
so it is our duty to love ourselves in the same sense.
We rightly desire our own perfection,
for that is a consequence of our love for God.
For if we are perfect, God is by so much the more loved and honoured.
Self-love, therefore, is concerned with the growth of the soul in grace, and we have a very obvious duty, arising from this
self-love, of cultivating virtue and of using all the means of grace which God gives us.
But the motive of this love is the fact that God loves us.
We love ourselves for God's sake, that He may be glorified in us, and for the sake of those good qualities that He has created in
us.
The theological virtue of love extends also in a secondary sense to
our bodies and to irrational creatures.
We cannot love these directly, in the sense that we wish that they too should love and honour God.
For that they cannot do. The mutual friendship which love implies is only possible between God and' rational creatures, who alone
are capable of sharing in the divine nature. But we may and should love our bodies and other creatures as being made by God for
His own glory and for the use and enjoyment of men. Such love of creatures induces a proper reverence and respect for nature and a
care for the right use of the things that God has made. Thus we shall love our own body, not for its own sake, but in so far as we
are able to use it in the service of God, and in so far as it is the temple of the Holy Spirit. For the body is in a measure
sanctified, and the glory and happiness of the soul is reflected in and redounds upon it. Consequently we have a duty to take all
reasonable precautions to preserve our life and health, and to discipline the body that it may be able and strong to labour for
God. We have no duty to hate the body as such, or to seek mortification as an end in itself. Rather, subject to freedom from sin,
we have a duty to enjoy all reasonable earthly pleasures and to make proper use of all earthly creatures, with humble gratitude to
God, their author.
Before we leave this subject of the objects of the theological virtue of love, it may be
worthwhile to consider what is meant by the command to love our enemies.
From what has been already said, it is clear that this has nothing to do, essentially, with any feeling of liking or affection
towards them.
Again, it is clear that we are not expected to love them in connection with their hatred for us, or the evil qualities in them,
which are the cause of their having wronged us.
For to love is to desire their true good.
And their hatred and their evil qualities are bad things.
These we are not to love but to hate, and to reform as much as we may.
The command to love our enemies is a part of the command to love our neighbours,
which is a universal command embracing all mankind.
We are therefore bound to love them in general,
by wishing their true good as we do that of all others,
and by being ready to promote that good as and when opportunity occurs,
just as we would in the case of anybody else.
We must also show them all acts of ordinary courtesy, civility and consideration.
For while it may be sometimes consonant with love to punish our enemies,
it is never so consonant to be revengeful or vindictive.
In addition to this general duty, it is incumbent on us to give active assistance to our enemies, if they are in great need.
Moreover, to single out, where possible, our enemies for special acts of love is a great help in training us to exhibit a fuller
love for our neighbours in general, and in checking within us any tendency towards vindictiveness. It is also a most laudable sign
of our love for God, that we are thus ready to love even our enemies because they also are the children of God.
The statement that it is incumbent on us to assist our enemies if they are in great need, with the implication that we have no such duty unless they are in great need, depends on the view that there is a certain order in the objects of love. At first sight it seems odd that we should have a duty to love one class of persons more than another, especially since the motive of love is that all men are alike capable of union with God and are to be loved for God's sake. And it seems odd that it can ever be right not to help another in need, whoever he is, and whether his need be great or small. But a little reflection shows that by the nature of things it must be so. In performing acts of love, it is obvious that we cannot actively love everybody. Our knowledge, and our resources of time, strength and money are totally inadequate. We are constantly being confronted, therefore, with the necessity of making a choice. And in making that choice we have to have a scheme of priorities.
The first and supreme object of love is God. This takes precedence over everything else. For no consideration, no matter how great another's need, may we do something that we know is displeasing to God. This is obvious and needs no further comment. Besides, if the service we are asked to render to another is in fact displeasing to God, it cannot be in that other's true interest, so that to render it could not be an act of love towards him. This being said, how are we to judge between our duty to love ourselves and our neighbour and between the rival claims of different neighbours?
It seems paradoxical to say that we ought to love ourselves more than our neighbours. Yet in view of what we have already said about God being the primary object of love, it is clear that in one sense, at least, this is so. We may not commit a sin in order to benefit our neighbours. We must so far prefer our own spiritual welfare that we will not sacrifice it to our neighbour's need. St. Thomas (II, 11, quaest. xxvi, art. 4) explains that a man loves himself, with the theological virtue of love, because and in so far as he is a partaker of the goodness of God. He loves his neighbour in so far as the neighbour shares with him in the goodness of God. But it is more important that the man himself partake of the goodness of God, since otherwise his neighbour cannot share it with him. Therefore a man's first duty is to love himself, by keeping himself in a state of grace. For a man to say that he would willingly be damned himself if thereby he could save his neighbour is a meaningless exaggeration. For a willingness to be damned, which means a willingness to offend and displease God, destroys and contradicts the very basis of his love for his neighbour out of which this willingness is supposed to arise. For that basis is a common love for God and a sharing together in the goodness of God, as the children of God. To love God is to love oneself in the sense of desiring and promoting one's union with God. To prefer a neighbour to oneself in this respect is to deny that love for God.
The conclusion from this is that it can never be right to commit a sin in order to benefit a neighbour or even the whole world. At first sight this seems questionable. Are we never to tell a lie, even when by so doing we might avert the most disastrous consequences? Apparently never. Yet how many of us really think that? Most people, when faced with such an emergency, would be prepared to tell the lie not merely to avoid spiritual damage to a neighbour, but even to avoid grave material damage. But that is not necessarily because men think it right to seek their neighbour's good before their own. It is, rather, that in telling this particular lie men do not consider that they are, in fact, committing a sin. The position is this. On the one hand there is a duty, in normal circumstances, to tell the truth. On the other hand there is a duty, in normal circumstances and so far as we may, to protect our neighbours from evil. Yet there is a higher duty than either, and one which is always binding; namely, to do what God wills and to promote His Kingdom. In deciding to tell the lie, men decide that in the circumstances this higher duty is best performed by ignoring the duty to tell the truth, and fulfilling the duty to protect our neighbour. And in doing this there is no question of preferring the neighbour's welfare to one's own. For in deciding to do what, in the circumstances, is held to be the will of God, a man is consulting his own welfare. It would be quite a different matter if a man decided to do what he knew to be wrong, in order to confer a benefit upon a neighbour. For example, if a solicitor embezzled the trust funds of one client in order to save another from ruin, knowing that such embezzlement was wrong even in these circumstances, his action would not be approved because of its charitable motive. Nor, probably, would that of a man who assassinated a dictator in order to prevent thereby the moral disasters of a war. Thus the duty to love ourselves before our neighbour means that we are never to do a deliberately wrong action for our neighbour's sake. The first duty which God has laid upon us is to love and serve Him. A deliberately wrong action is ex hypothesi contrary to that duty. In other words, the duty of charity towards our neighbour is limited by those moral principles, observance of which is incumbent upon us by our duty to love ourselves.
But if we are not to sacrifice in this way our spiritual welfare for our neighbour's sake, neither are we to sacrifice his spiritual welfare to our material advantage. We shall deal with this question from another angle when we come to discuss the problem of scandal. Here it is enough to say that if my neighbour is in extreme moral danger, I am bound to come to his assistance even at risk of my life. That is, provided that the danger is not of his own incurring, and that my intervention has a reasonable chance of success. Thus a man has a duty to rescue a child from immoral surroundings, if he can, even though it may involve him in considerable danger. And a priest has a duty to minister the sacraments to his people in times of war or of plague, even though he may lose his life thereby. For spiritual things take precedence over material.
This principle is of overriding importance, particularly in the matter of almsgiving, to which we may now turn our attention. The duty to love our neighbour manifestly includes the duty to give alms. For the temporal assistance of almsgiving is the most obvious act of charity whereby we may show our love for our neighbour. Yet it raises many difficulties. It is not easy to decide either how much we ought to give away nor to whom. It is important to have clear principles in this matter.
In the first place, as we have said, spiritual matters take precedence over everything else. That is, the things that concern the growth of the soul in grace and its union with God are our first concern. To promote them is the greatest good we can do our neighbour, and by our care and concern for him in this respect we show our true love for him. Secondly, those material goods that directly influence the natural growth and development take precedence over merely accidental advantages. Life, health, education, freedom are more important than reputation, rank and wealth. We have a greater duty to assist our neighbour in connection with the former than the latter.
Since we cannot actively assist everybody, it is obvious that those who are in greatest
need deserve our first attention. Need is measured by reference not only to the degree of poverty, but also to the kind of good
things which are lacking or endangered.
There are said to be three degrees of need.
(1) Extreme need. This is the case of those who
are threatened with loss of life or soul and who have no one else to whom they can turn for help. Their poverty is extreme and
touches just those things which are most important. For loss of life or soul is to be taken to mean such things as loss of reason,
or health, or liberty, or limbs.
(2) Grave need. This is the case of those who,
threatened with loss of life or soul, have others beside ourselves to whom they can turn, or who can ward off the danger
themselves by their own efforts, though with difficulty. Or it is the case of those who are threatened with a less serious danger,
for example with unjust imprisonment or grave illness or considerable financial loss.
(3) Ordinary need. This is the case of persons in
need of assistance in some respect or other, but not in desperate need. Either because they can just get along without help,
though with difficulty, or because there are many others beside ourselves able and willing to help them.
Wherever we meet with a case of extreme need, we are under a grave
obligation to help.
We have a duty to come to our neighbour's assistance in such circumstances, even
though it involves us in considerable inconvenience or loss.
That is to say, if there is no one else to help, it is absolutely incumbent on us to do all that we can, short of actually
impoverishing ourselves or losing our lives. Thus if I had a sister married to a man with whom she could not continue to live
without grave danger to her life or morals, and who had no one else to whom to turn and no money on which to live, I should be
bound to take her into my own home, even though I could not properly afford to support her. I should be under a similar obligation
towards a woman quite unconnected with me, if, in fact, there was no one else able and willing to help her.
Where we meet with a case of grave need we are under an
obligation to help out of our superfluous income, if there is no one else willing or able to do so.
It is a grave obligation, but does not extend to the same degree of self-sacrifice as does that of extreme need, for we are only
called upon to give of our superfluity.
What is surplus income is not always easy to determine.
It may be of interest to give the words of St. Thomas on this point (II, 11, quaest. xx, art. 6):
"In the first place certain things are necessary to support life. If a man has only just enough to support himself and his
family with the bare necessities of life, he has no surplus income. There is no question of there being then any duty for him to
give alms, except in cases of extreme need. But in the second place a thing may be said to be necessary in the sense that without
it a man cannot be said to maintain that standard of living to which he is accustomed or to which his rank and position entitle
him. As to this, it is impossible to lay down any fixed rule. A man may have a large increase in his income, and it would still be
difficult to say with certainty that he had more than was necessary in this sense. Or he might sustain great losses, and still be
able to keep up his position without any serious inconvenience. But anyway, a man is not bound to give alms out of necessities
of this kind. For it would be excessive for him so to deprive himself that he could not fittingly maintain his position and
carry on his business.
But to this rule there are three exceptions.
First, if a man changes his rank; for example, if he becomes a monk, then he ought to give everything away.
Second, when necessaries of this kind can easily be re-acquired, so that he does not suffer any great inconvenience."
(For example, a rich man might easily incur a temporary overdraft, or lend his house for a period.)
"And third, in a case of extreme need."
It is very important to grasp what is meant by surplus income,
and to understand that, apart from extreme need, it is only out of surplus income that almsgiving is a grave obligation.
It is a false rigorism to extend this obligation too far, or to regard everything as superfluous that is not strictly necessary.
The state of the clergy of the Church of England now is such that it is probable that only in the case of a very few of them is
there much income which can with certainty be regarded as superfluous. They have so many and such various commitments, and so
many things are necessary to them for the efficient performance of their duties, that it is not unlikely that St. Thomas, at
least, would rule that they had nothing beyond their need; and in view of the changed value of money, the same may be said of many
of those who are living on pensions or otherwise fixed incomes.
The greatest difficulty in the matter of almsgiving probably arises
in connection with those who are only in ordinary need.
With the limited resources at our disposal, it is difficult to decide how much we ought to give and to whom. It is certainly not
obligatory to give away the whole of our surplus income. To spend some of our money on ourselves and our friends is not sinful. St. Alphonsus (Lib. Ill, no. 32) suggests that two per cent is about the right proportion, though that might be excessive in the case of people with very large incomes. The figure probably strikes the
average reader as too small. But it must be remembered that this is for ordinary alms to persons in ordinary need, wholly apart
from any special claims upon us by persons in grave or extreme need. And if the calculation were made exclusive of what is paid
in income tax and rates - part of which is for services rendered and part compulsory almsgiving - it is probable that the result
is not far out. Yet good Christians are not greatly concerned about what is the minimum obligation in this matter. Readily moved
by the impulse of pity and love, they are anxious to do all that they can. Their difficulty, rather, is to determine how to divide
their inadequate resources among the number of claimants upon them.
In this connection there are three things to be borne in mind.
1. Spiritual goods and needs take precedence over material.
2. Those who are nearly connected with us have first claim on our charity before others.
3. Almsgiving is not a duty unless the recipient is in real need.
And those in greater need have a prior claim over those whose need is less. Each of these principles deserves a little further
consideration.
The Christian, in assessing the various calls upon him, is bound to pay special attention to those that are concerned with the work of the Church. The maintenance of parochial life and activity in poor parishes by assisting to pay the stipends of parish priests and curates has an especially forceful claim upon Christians. It is of greater importance that the Church be active in ministering to the spiritual needs of the poor inhabitants of slum parishes than that their material wants be alleviated. By so doing a true charity is displayed, which is concerned with the real and eternal welfare and happiness of those whom it seeks to benefit. This prior claim of specifically Church work is further reinforced by a consideration of the third principle. There are many others, including the State itself, who are able and willing to alleviate material needs. Only Church people are willing to minister to spiritual needs. So that, in this sense, the material needs are less than the spiritual and have a less urgent claim on Christians. If Christians do not give to the Church, that the Gospel may be preached and the sacraments regularly ministered, no one will. And it is a true charity to assist the very poor to carry their parochial expenses.
Further, it is the duty of Christians to "love the brotherhood". Christians are specially and intimately connected with one another as fellow members of the Body of Christ. So that, by our second principle, the work of the Church has a special claim on the charity of Christians. It is true that under this principle the chief claim is held by our relatives - parents, husband or wife, children - and our friends. Not only do they stand closest to us, but the motive of gratitude for the many kindnesses and benefits we have received from their hands is added to the impulse of charity. It is true also that, by this principle, even mere acquaintances come before strangers, and fellow countrymen before foreigners. "Charity begins at home." This is mere common sense, and we have no difficulty in recognising the claims which such persons have upon us, nor in determining in any given set of circumstances which of them has the greatest claim. Nevertheless, as between strangers, and where those closely connected with us are not in any serious need, the claims of our fellow Christians, simply on the ground of their connection with us as Christians, are very forceful. Hence such causes as Church almshouses, Clergy Widows and Orphans Funds, the relief of suffering among Chinese or Indian Christians should stand high on our list.
Thus we may conclude that in cases of ordinary need - as distinct from extreme need - we have only a certain duty to give alms out of our superfluity. But to that extent we have a duty, and wholly to ignore it is undoubtedly sinful. In determining to whom we ought to give alms of this kind, we shall take into account the nature of the benefit we can confer - whether it is the relief of a physical need, or of a spiritual need, or of both - the closeness of the relationship to us of the recipient, and the degree of his need, both in itself and measured in terms of the readiness of others besides ourselves to help. From all these considerations it will generally result that, because there are so many other good but non-Christian people willing to subscribe to them, such causes as hospitals, Service benevolent funds, social settlements and so forth will give place to specifically Christian and Church causes and societies. All Christians ought to consider very seriously the claim on them of missionary work, Church schools, Church building and endowment funds, the maintenance of the clergy and any other particular Church appeal from time to time authoritatively issued. For to give to any such is true and Christian almsgiving; just as much so, if not more, than giving to particular poor persons or responding to appeals for the relief of physical distress.
Just as it is the duty of the Christian in charity to promote his
neighbour's welfare, so it is his duty to refrain from actions that will damage his neighbour, and that not only materially
but also spiritually.
To cause one's neighbour spiritual damage is to commit the sin of "scandal".
It is to put a stumbling block in the way of our neighbours.
This happens when a word or action of ours is partially responsible for somebody
else committing a sin. Scandal may be either active or passive.
It is active when a man by his action intends to influence somebody else to sin, or when his action is of such a nature that it must necessarily act as an
incitement to sin.
Passive scandal is when the
agent does not intend to tempt anyone, and when his action is, in itself, perfectly legitimate,
but it happens that somebody else is thereby tempted to sin.
Active scandal is necessarily always sinful.
It is a direct offence against the virtue of charity.
It is more sinful to tempt another deliberately, but it is also certainly sinful, apart from any such deliberate intention, to act
in such a way as must necessarily result in temptation to others. Obvious examples of active scandal, besides direct and wilful
temptation, are the use of bad language and impure conversation; the making or exhibiting of obscene books, pictures or plays; in
fact, anything which would come under the general description of "setting a bad example".
Passive scandal is not always sinful.
Although we have, in general, a duty to take all reasonable precautions to ensure that we do not, even unwittingly, tempt another
to sin, yet we are absolved from this duty and from any guilt in this respect if our neighbour sins out of pure perversity, taking
offence against an action of ours which was perfectly right and proper and using it as an excuse for his own sin. It is not always
easy to determine when passive scandal is sinful and when it is not. It is clear that the duty not to cause others to stumble does
not extend to requiring us to give up altogether acts that are essential to our own spiritual welfare. It is equally clear that if
an occasional or partial abstention from such actions will remove from another an incitement to sin, then we ought so to abstain.
For example, suppose that a woman is married to a man who is violently anti-religious and who is moved to furious anger and
blasphemy whenever he observes his wife performing her religious duties. It would not be right for the woman to give up going to
Communion altogether, and the guilt of her husband's anger and blasphemy could not be laid at her door. On the other hand, she
ought to give up going to Communion sometimes, for example on occasions when her husband is in a particularly bad temper; and she
ought, in general, to make her religious activities as little ostentatious as possible.
Or again, fashionable women's dress may be quite decent in itself, and yet excite desire in others. Sunbathing and mixed bathing, or the more modern types of dancing are no doubt quite innocent in themselves, and yet may be a source of temptation to others. On the whole it is not sinful to indulge in any of these things, at least in the company of grown-up and more or less sophisticated persons. For it may be presumed that for such people they constitute no temptation. But where the young and inexperienced are concerned, or when any of these activities are certainly known to be provocative and dangerous, it is a duty in charity to abstain from them. For although we do not intend that others should sin because of our example, yet we are morally responsible for their sin, if we foresaw or ought to have foreseen that our actions would expose them to serious temptation.
Our duty in this respect knows almost no limits, if it is only the sacrifice of our own pleasure and convenience that is involved. Yet this must not be allowed to lead to an excessive scrupulosity and fear. Actions which are perfectly legitimate and harmless need not be forgone because of a mere possibility that someone may misconstrue them, or because someone will wilfully and perversely twist them into an excuse and precedent for his own sin. A temperate use of alcohol or attendance at the theatre is not to be denied to the clergy because some may use these examples as an excuse for drunkenness or for going to obscene plays. In this, as in all things, the path of virtue is the path of reason. It is our duty to take all reasonable precautions not to provide occasions of sin to others. We have no duty to take excessive and unreasonable precautions.
Closely allied to scandal as an offence against the duty to love our
neighbour, is "co-operation" in another's sinful act.
For if it is wrong to tempt our neighbour to sin, a fortiori it is wrong positively to assist him in his sin.
Yet just as scandal is sometimes free from guilt, so, sometimes, co-operation is
legitimate.
The matter is of some importance and difficulty.
It is necessary in the first place to distinguish between formal and material co-operation.
Co-operation is formal when one man actively helps another in the
performance of a wrong act.
For example, if two men set out on a robbing expedition, and one man threatens with a revolver while the other removes watch and
pocket book from the person thus threatened, the man with the revolver is formally co-operating in the robbery.
Co-operation is material only when it involves no approval of the sinful
act, and consists in a mere assistance by the performance of some ancillary act that is not wrong in itself.
Thus he who provides a market for stolen goods by receiving and selling them is guilty of material co-operation, unless he
approves of theft and acts as he does in order to encourage and facilitate theft. In that case his co-operation is formal.
Formal co-operation is always sinful, since it involves either a deliberate and voluntary sharing in a sinful act, or if not that,
an approval of a sinful act. In determining whether material co-operation is sinful or not, it is necessary to make further
distinctions.
Material co-operation may be immediate; that is, it may be actual co-operation in the sinful act itself, though without approval of it. This is comparatively rare, since it is difficult to co-operate in the act itself without having approval of it, and so being guilty of formal co-operation. Yet the situation arises sometimes where violent threats are used to induce co-operation. For example, a servant might be threatened with dismissal, or a person being blackmailed with exposure, unless they agreed to co-operate. Such immediate material co-operation is almost always sinful: perhaps the only exception is where refusal to co-operate would result in one's being murdered.
Material co-operation is more generally mediate; that is, the kind of co-operation described above as a mere assistance, without approval, by the performance of some ancillary act that is not wrong in itself. Such mediate co-operation may be either proximate or remote. It is proximate when it is closely connected with the sinful act and more or less indispensable to its successful performance. It is remote when it provides an indirect and by no means essential aid to the doing of the sinful act.
Such mediate co-operation is sometimes lawful, provided that it does not involve us in doing something intrinsically wrong, and provided there is a sufficient cause. It is obvious that there will often be the greatest difficulty in determining whether the action proposed is intrinsically wrong or not, and in determining whether there is a sufficient cause. In both judgments there is great room for a difference of opinion, and the whole subject opens up a wide field for casuistry. It is only possible here to give the general principles and to add one or two examples. The principles are taken from St. Alphonsus.
St. Alphonsus (Lib. Ill, 63) explains why material co-operation is sometimes lawful, in this way: "If you do an action in itself indifferent and without any evil intention, and another uses that action as an occasion of sin, you are not bound to prevent him, except in charity. But the duty arising from charity is not binding at the cost of grave personal inconvenience" (as we have seen in the matter of almsgiving, the duty of charity is not unlimited: it is circumscribed by the duty to love oneself and by the claims of others; it is modified by one's own absolute necessities and limitations and by a comparison of the rival needs of others). "Therefore, in co-operating you do not sin if you have a just cause. For the other man's sin does not arise from your co-operation, but from his own wickedness, which abuses your action. Nor can you say that your action, though in itself indifferent, becomes sinful because of the circumstance of its being joined with his evil intention. Because your action is not of itself joined with his evil will, but he attaches his evil will to your action, and so your action is not itself what influences him to sin, it is only an occasion, which he misuses as an opportunity for sin."
Yet this justification clearly holds good only if there is a sufficient excuse for
co-operation. The duty, in charity, to prevent another from sinning if we can, and still more not in any way to make it easier
for him to sin, is a clear one. And it is only if it involves us in very great inconvenience that it ceases to be binding. It is
of the utmost importance, therefore, to understand what kind of excuse is sufficient to justify material co-operation. St.
Alphonsus (III, 59) quotes with approval these general considerations,
(1) The graver the sin, the more urgent must be the excuse for your co-operation.
(2) The more probable it is that without your co-operation the sin will not be done, the greater must be your excuse.
(3) The more proximate and less remote your co-operation is, the greater reason must you have for co-operating.
(4) The less general right you have to perform the particular action in which your co-operation consists, the greater reason must
you have for performing that action on this particular occasion.
(5) The more the rights of others are violated by the sinful act, the greater must be your excuse for co-operating in it.
The stock example used to illustrate this question of co-operation is that of the taxi-driver. If a fare stops a taxi and asks the driver to drive him to a brothel, it would be sinful co-operation for the driver to do so. It might be formal co-operation, involving approval by the taxi-driver of brothels in general, and of this brothel in particular, whose business he is thus instrumental in promoting. Or if not that, it would be material co-operation for which there was insufficient excuse. The co-operation is extremely proximate, since it may be presumed that the fare will have great difficulty in finding a brothel unless the taxi-driver takes him to one. The sin of fornication is a grave one. Although a taxi-driver has a perfect right to accept fares and to drive them to their destination, he has no right or duty to name their destination for them, or to drive them to brothels. All these are conditions which demand an extremely grave reason if such material co-operation is to be justified. It is probable that nothing would justify it, short of the point of a revolver.
The situation would be different if instead of "Drive me to a brothel" the fare said "Drive me to such-and-such a house in such-and-such a street", which the driver happened to know was a brothel. Here the driver has a perfect right, and in general a duty, to drive fares to the places to which they direct him. And it is not part of his job to enquire what they propose to do when they get there. Moreover, his co-operation, though proximate, is not indispensable nor even very necessary. The fare will probably get another taxi easily enough, or, if the worst comes to the worst, may walk. Yet the sin is grave and the co-operation proximate. It will need a serious reason to justify the taxi-driver in driving this passenger; yet, given that reason, he will not be doing anything sinful. The mere loss of the profit on that particular journey would not be a sufficient excuse. On the other hand, if the proposed passenger were a friend of his employer's and influential with him, and threatened to procure his dismissal if he did not comply, that would probably constitute a sufficient reason.
A second example may be drawn from the sale of certain objects. If the objects in question can only be put to a sinful use - if they cannot conceivably be used for any other purpose - then some authorities hold that their sale is never lawful, others that an exceedingly grave cause may justify it. The former view is on the ground that the sale must involve co-operation in the evil intention of the buyer, and that therefore the co-operation must be formal. The latter view is on the ground that it is possible for the vendor to dissociate himself entirely from the intention of the purchaser, so that the co-operation is only material and therefore, in certain unusual circumstances, justifiable. The case, however, is different if the objects offered for sale are capable of a lawful use. Co-operation, then, may be only material and justifiable for a sufficiently grave reason. If, for example, the object is one which can be innocently used, but normally is not so used, then the vendor is in general morally bound to make sure that this particular purchaser does intend an innocent use; yet for a grave reason it would be lawful both not to make any enquiries and to continue with the sale. But suppose that the vendor is fairly sure that the purchaser does intend to make a sinful use of the object, what then? The sale would undoubtedly be sinful in all ordinary circumstances, but it might be justifiable for a very grave cause, at least if the article is easily obtainable elsewhere, and it is clear that the purchaser is determined to get it somewhere and make a sinful use of it.
This whole question of co-operation through the sale of certain articles may be thus illustrated. A man enters an ironmonger's shop and asks for a "jemmy". It is possible to use a "jemmy" innocently - the purchaser may be an officer of the CID who has left his own at home - but it is much more probable that the purchaser is a burglar. Normally the sale would be sinful and the ironmonger would be guilty of being an accomplice before the act of burglary. But in special circumstances, in the face of threats or in the likelihood of a refusal involving him in a serious loss of business - for example, if the purchaser were one of a gang who had the power to cause his shop to be boycotted - the sale would be allowable. Again, if a man whom the shopkeeper knew to be a burglar walked in and asked to buy a ladder, the sale would be justifiable for a slightly less grave reason; though, of course, the mere loss of profit on that particular transaction would not by itself be sufficient. The reason for requiring a slightly less grave reason is that a ladder can easily be bought elsewhere, so that the shopkeeper's co-operation is not so essential.
The sale of contraceptives is another obvious illustration of this subject matter. If it be held that the use of contraceptives is in all circumstances wrong, then the sale of contraceptives will always be sinful according to one school of thought; it will be justified only in the most exceptional circumstances according to the other. If it be held that it is sometimes legitimate to use them, then their sale would be innocent whenever the vendor was morally certain that they would be legitimately used. Yet, because they are customarily abused, no vendor would be justified in selling them unless he were so morally certain, except for a very grave cause. This is certainly true in the case of the owner of a shop; it is probably true, also, in the case of an assistant. But the position of the assistant is somewhat different. As he is only acting under orders, he has less responsibility than his principal, and it may be that a less urgent excuse is enough to free him from any blame for co-operation.
Most of the cases of co-operation that raise problems are cases of servants who are required to co-operate in sinful acts in the course of their duty or employment. Besides the shop assistant selling articles of doubtful morality, we may instance the employees of advertising firms required to popularise falsehoods, or the typist who every morning has to type some dozen or so letters beginning "Dear sir, yours is the only complaint we have ever had", or the office-boy who takes these letters to post. These are all acting, not on their own responsibility, but as agents, and the main charge of immorality must be laid at the door of their employers. Nevertheless they are all involved in co-operation, and the question whether that co-operation is excusable or not must be determined by a consideration of the circumstances in each case. That of the office boy, for example, is extremely remote, and is sufficiently excused by the mere fact that he is only doing what he is told. And whenever the sin involved is not a very serious one, it is probable that the simple duty of service is sufficient warrant. But where the sin is more serious, and particularly if the co-operation is fairly proximate, it is not enough simply to plead that one is only an employee. In such cases the co-operation is sinful, unless further reasons can be adduced. In all such cases it would be right and a duty to seek some other employment. But in times of scarcity of employment, or if changing one's employment would involve being turned out of one's house and there is a housing shortage, and if there are dependants whom one has to maintain and house, these are considerations which would justify the co-operation in all but the most serious matters. Yet they would justify it only until other employment were found: they would not affect the duty to take all possible steps to find that other employment. That duty arises from the generally sinful character of even material co-operation in another's sin, as an offence against charity. We owe it, in love, neither to tempt our neighbour by being a cause of scandal to him, nor to assist him if he be already bent and decided on sin. On the contrary, the virtue of charity demands that in all things we wish and, so far as we can, actively promote his true good and welfare. To tempt him to sin or to assist him in sin is thus the direct opposite of love, as sin is the opposite of welfare. To shield our neighbour from sin and to encourage him to virtue is the greatest service we can render him and the truest expression of Christian love. For that love regards all men as first and foremost the children of God and heirs of Heaven.